USA and Canada Immigration Data Sharing of travel

Perhaps. I do not really know. But I think probably at some level, but not necessarily fully shared database information. Bottom line, though, I am quite confident they can access this information at least on a case-by-case basis if CBSA discerns the need for it in a particular case.

Remember, government agencies have access to information at levels that are not revealed publicly; their access to and use of such information may be narrowly prescribed, but, again, in at least a case-by-case inquiry they most likely have access to far more information than most of us might imagine (short of paranoia).

A lot of the ifs and maybes are entangled at the base level of information: its collection, storage, and retrieval/access.

It is far from certain, for example, what information is consistently (let alone always) captured/collected regarding vehicular crossings, where and how what information that is captured is stored, and who has what sort of access to that information. For example, can any CBSA officer readily access a database containing that information? Yes as to the information captured and stored by CBSA, but again, it is far from certain how much such information is captured let alone stored in a manner that allows access by a simple query.

Yes, both the U.S. and Canada publicly disclose that they share a great deal of information at various levels. They absolutely share certain national and border security related information, but even here there are many suggestions that turf protection insulates the information gathered by some agencies from access by other agencies, even among law enforcement and national security agencies on the same side of the border let alone cross-border.

Another example: CBSA officers obviously can make a simple query into a database that is at least comparable to if not the U.S. NCIC (criminal records) database itself . . . anyone referred to secondary at a POE for immigration (as opposed to merely for customs) is most likely screened this way . . . that is, the Canadian Border Services officer runs a name query into a U.S. maintained criminal records database.

The manual you cite is about more than that, however, and talks about the procedures and processes related to sharing more specific information. The point here is that there is a difference between open access to whole databases versus requests for specific information on a case-by-case basis. The manual does not illuminate much as to what sort of "sharing" is involved with any particular set of information.

This brings it back around to the NCIC criminal records example: that is a clear example of shared database . . . Canadian officers can directly access (as in run their own queries) and retrieve information from the database at large. In contrast, there are obviously many repositories of information about individuals that cannot be routinely accessed by an agency in the other country . . . indeed, there are such databases for which various laws, including especially privacy laws, strictly limit access by different agencies in the same country (let alone by agencies in the other country). Some of the latter can, nonetheless, be accessed on a case-by-case basis, with the level of formality involved (such as the "request" process discussed in the operational manual referred to) varying depending on many things (nature and sensitivity of the information high among the factors, balanced against the "need" to know factors).

Thus:

Therefore I would assume that CIC will have full records of your entries and exits from the US, to the extent that DHS has recorded them.

First: In contrast to the NCIC type of database information, I disagree that CIC would have "full records." I doubt they even have ready access to the "full" records maintained by U.S. agencies. They probably have extensive access to obtain specific information on a request-by-request basis. But in contrast it seems very unlikely that the U.S. allows open access to homeland security databases by CBSA officers let alone CIC officers.

Secondly, though, the kicker in what I quoted is the phrase "to the extent that DHS has recorded them." Foremost, so far it does not appear that either the U.S. or Canada is consistently let alone always recording "exits" from their respective countries. Exits may be inferred from entries to the other country, which are consistently (though it appears not always as yet . . . they are moving toward this, but of course the technology costs a lot of money) captured at least via the camera scan of license plates which is most likely recorded into some kind of database. However, the extent of ready access into those databases is also far from certain.

The bottom line, it seems to me, is, again, the probability that the respective governments have access to far more information at levels that would surprise most of us (again, short of paranoia), but that a lot of that information is not readily accessible in any run-of-the-mill inquiry . . . as the need for it elevates (if, for example, there is a perceived national security threat), the extent of access and recovery also increases (perhaps to levels that might surprise even the paranoid), but for routine immigration matters, not so much. (This is actually one of the major crossroads confronting immigration enforcement, since, for example, Canadian privacy laws restrict the extent to which personal information can even be recorded let alone accessed.)

canvis2006 wrote: CBSA keeps entry records, I am not sure to what extent the US-CBP/DHS keep records for US-related entries/exits.

US DHS keeps pretty much the same thing as CBSA. 


Sample page from US CBP FOIA response

I would note, however, that this information may or may not be readily accessible by CBSA or CIC; I think not (though of course am not sure). It is likely it could be obtained by specific request, mostly likely in a security context, but I doubt that CBSA or CIC have direct access to a database containing this information. I doubt that it is obtained by CBSA or CIC in routine circumstances or cases, even relative to applications for citizenship or renewal of PR cards, unless there is a security concern, or perhaps if a relatively formal investigation is initiated (perhaps attendant an appeal of a removal order possibly). Again, I do not know for sure, but am fairly confident.

And similarly for U.S. authorities relative to CBSA records.

That is, I do not think it is comparable to the access either side has to the other side's criminal records data (that is, CBSA access to the U.S. NCIC database, and U.S. Border Services access to the RCMP's criminal records database).

For an illustrative example of how complicated and restricted the sharing of information is, see recent stories about the conflict between U.S. rules and Canadian privacy laws regarding passengers' information for flights originating in Canada and flying through American airspace (some of which, as I understand it, may be flights originating and ending in Canadian locations but technically crossing U.S. airspace in route).

One news story related to this can be found at:

http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2010/01/01/airlines-passenger-privacy001.html

There are, of course, others.

The underlying significance has to do with how complicated, and limited, sharing information is. While this particular issue does not illustrate such complications relative to sharing information between Canadian agencies, similar privacy law restriction also limit the extent to which personal data can be shared even between two separate parts of the Canadian government, let alone with foreign government entities.

Note: this is not to say there is not a good deal of sharing across the border. Obviously, as discussed above, there is, such as CBSA's access to the data maintained in the U.S. NCIC system (and similarly, the U.S. Border protection agency's access to similar data maintained by the RCMP . . . and both probably have very similar access to INTERPOL data as well). It is to note, however, that there are indeed substantial limitations and outright restrictions on the sharing of personal data.